Lolitas, Vladimir Nabokov

au sujet de Vladimir Nabokov dont j’ai écrit des billets en octobre 2014, merci beaucoup à zv222, pour le lien ci-présent  et pour son commentaire intéressant.Bonne journée à tout le monde.

source: , un extrait

his already old novel (1955!) has made its way to the pantheon of the world most celebrated literature, despite its controversial nature, and continues to draw the attention of a constant number of readers throughout the world.

The prose of Vladimir Nabokov alone is enough to fall under the spell of his witty text, but The charm of the novel is decupled by the amount of cultural references, symbolic images and let’s not forget its humour! Also, Nabokov, as he admitted, gave the promise of a riddle-game left for the benefit of the deserving reader. Lolita’s riddle.

How many new readers realize the richness of what they have between their hands? Nabokov’s sophisticated playful mind left enough dark matter for curious minds to ponder and delve into it sixty years later.

We would think that such a scrutinized book would have gave up its soul long ago, but we would be wrong. Secrets still lie within shadows hidden betwen the lines. Despite the cleverness and thickness of literary references of Alfred Appel’s « The Annotated Lolita », one can’t help thinking something’s missing. Some recurring (and sometimes almost out of place) elements in the book seem to beg for attention, and yet they’re left ignored and mute with their untold secrets.

Here’s a big part of what I have gathered (minus tens of little things of lesser importance that I found but didn’t care to add). the work of collection of the references is at his minimum too. There are even references behind references, so I’ll let that aside for such a sketchy attempt.

Nabokov as he admitted it, has hidden a riddle-game left for the benefit of the deserving reader. Lolita’s riddle.

In an interview in 1962 for the BBC when aked on why he wrote “Lolita”: “(…) I’ve no general ideas to exploit, I just like composing riddles with elegant solutions.”. Two years later, in an interview with Playboy in 1964, about the writing of « Lolita », he confessed « She was like the composition of a beautiful puzzle – its composition and its solution at the same time, since one is mirror view of the other, depending on the way you look. ».

The basic core of the riddle is now, I believe, mostly solved (at a superficial level, as there are still much to say about it. And there is also still MUCH to discover. It’s still a raw sketch in a way) and I propose to my reader to take a trip in the depth of « Lolita », a novel that you had read without knowing that there was a « phantom chapter », only deciphered by a careful scrutiny of the text, allowing to reach a second level of reading.

In order to say that we resolved Lolita’s riddle we have to find a solution that addresses efficiently all the persistent references and mysterious recurring elements (numbers and words). And of course, it must work in every instances.

In order to lead us to his intended hidden goal, Nabokov has « sprinkled » his text with hints hidden in « plain sight ». The solution of the puzzle has to be reached by collecting all the specific references left by the author. The similar nature of these references won’t leave any room for doubts and the possibility of a conjonction of coincidences will be safely discarded.

There are direct references, but there are also sometimes references behind references, and cross-references all pointing directly or indirectly to the same direction.

These hints, left by Nabokov, are basically « tags » which are either recurring dates or recurring words. These dates and words can be rattached to a specific context that we recognize as  omnipresent when we have indetified it.

Once this context is identified, the key is known.

Every time you use the key (the sesame to a subjacent level of reading) in a textual keyhole (there are moments in the text when there are salliant mentions: a strange book title, a weird lastname or any sort of incongruity – this is Nabokov nudging and winking to you), it opens and more is to be seen, confirming each time even more that the puzzle has been solved.

In fact the key can basically be reduced to one name. One person. With this name, all the rest follows.

And when we know this key, we realize that the solution of the riddle had been ostensibly agitated by Humbert (Or more exactly Vladimir Nabokov) right in front of our unsuspecting eyes.

This key « with its numbered dangler of carved wood », bearing the number 342.

I shall not exist if you do not imagine me

The beginning of the story is set on La Côte d’Azur (more precisely, probably Monaco – a principality by the sea). This latter allusion is made in reference to Egar Allan Poe’s (1809-1849) poem « Annabel Lee », and indeed, the beginning of « Lolita » is full of references to this work: for instance, Humbert’s love is named Annabel Leigh (like Poe’s Annabel Lee), there are direct alluions to the poem (« the misinformed, simple, noble-winged seraphs, envied » p.9 TAL, «  », even his use of the spelling “lo-LEE-ta” seems to be a discreet allusion to the character of the poem). In Nabokov’s mind, these Poe allusions are directly linked to the fact this famous American author was in love with Virginia Clemm, a thirteen years old girl (even the date when Humbert stops searching for Lolita, on 09/18/49 could also be a reference to Edgar Allan Poe (alternately, to Lorina Liddell – more on this later)).


mon billet en octobre 2014 était le suivant:

The Link between the Ruble and Keynes by Steve H.Hanke

Steve H. Hanke , professeur d’économie appliquée à l’Université Johns Hopkins, est Senior Fellow et directeur du Projet des Devises Troubled au Cato Institute.Steve H.Hanke est un économiste américain connu pour son important travail sur les tableaux de change, la dollarisation, l’hyperinflation, et d’autres sujets en économie appliquée.

On March 3, 2014, the United States went to war with Russia. That’s when the U.S. first imposed sanctions. And, yes, sanctions are nothing more than war by non-military means. Then, on November 11 Russia committed a major misstep. It floated the ruble. Since then, the ruble hasn’t floated on a sea of tranquility. It has plunged in lockstep with oil — by about 25% and its volatility has soared to around 65%.

The ruble’s plunge means that Russian imports will be more expensive and exports more competitive. This combination will help keep Russia’s current account positive, which will offset some of Russia’s massive capital flight.

A currency board, rather than a floating ruble, would protect Russia from the specter of inflation.”
In addition, Russia’s fiscal accounts are denominated in depreciating rubles and its oil exports are invoiced in appreciating U.S. dollars. So, the fiscal blow from lower oil prices will be cushioned by a weak ruble.

But, there are limits to any temporary benefits from a ruble rout. When a currency takes a dive, the specter of inflation is always right around the corner. How can Russia avoid further damage and correct for its error of November 11?

Russia should abandon the floating exchange-rate regime, which it adopted on November 10. Oil and other commodities that Russia exports are priced and invoiced in U.S. dollars. By embracing a floating exchange-rate regime, Russia is inviting instability. The ruble’s nominal exchange rate will fluctuate with oil and other commodity prices. When the price of oil rises (falls) the ruble will appreciate (depreciate), and Russia will experience a roller-coaster ride distinguished by deflationary lows and inflationary highs. To avoid these wild rides, most of the big oil producers — Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates — link their currencies to the U.S. dollar. Russia should do the same.


To get things right, Russia should lift a page from John Maynard Keynes’ Russian playbook and establish a currency board.

Under a currency board system a central bank issues notes and coins. These are convertible into a foreign reserve currency at a fixed rate and on demand. As reserves, the monetary authority holds high-quality, interest bearing securities denominated in the reserve currency. Its reserves are equal to 100 per cent, or slightly more, of its notes and coins in circulation, as set by law. A central bank operating under a currency board rules does not accept deposits and it generates income from the difference between the interest paid on the securities it holds and the expense of maintaining its note and coin in circulation. It has no discretionary monetary policy. Instead, market forces alone determine the money supply.

There is an historical precedent in Russia for a currency board. After the Bolshevik Revolution, when troops from Britain and other allied nations invaded northern Russia, the currency was in chaos. The Russian civil war had begun, and every party involved in the conflict was issuing its own near-worthless money. There were more than 2,000 separate issuers of fiat rubles.

To facilitate trade, the British established a National Emission Caisse for northern Russia in 1918. The Caisse issued “British ruble” notes. They were backed by pounds sterling and convertible into pounds at a fixed rate. Kurt Schuler and I discovered documents at the archives in the British Foreign Office which prove that the father of the British ruble was none other than John Maynard Keynes, who was a British Treasury official at the time.

Despite the civil war, the British ruble was a great success. The currency never deviated from its fixed exchange rate with the British pound. In contrast to other Russian rubles, the British ruble was a reliable store of value. Naturally, the British ruble drove other rubles out of circulation. Unfortunately, the British ruble’s life was brief: The National Emission Caisse ceased operation in 1920, after allied troops withdrew from Russia.

Yes, it is time for Putin to lift a page from Keynes and follow what most large non-U.S. oil producers already do: link the ruble to the greenback.


Russia’s Steep Rate Increase Fails to Stem Ruble’s Decline by Andrew E. Kramer

MOSCOW — Despite the Russian central bank’s extraordinary move to defend the currency, the ruble’s value continued to slide on Tuesday, presenting President Vladimir V. Putin with an acute set of political and economic challenges.

Scenes that Russians hoped had receded into the past reappeared on the streets. Currency exchange signs blinked ever-changing digits. Russians rushed to appliance stores to buy washing machines or televisions to unload rubles. Unsure of prices, car dealerships like Volvo in Russia halted business, while Apple stopped online sales in the country.

After a middle-of-the night interest rate hike, a sense of economic chaos settled over the Russian capital. The ruble was in free fall, dropping under 80 rubles to the dollar, after opening the day at 64 to the dollar.

“We are seeing an economic crisis,” Natalia V. Akindinova, a professor at the Higher School of Economics, said in a telephone interview. “We are seeing a sharp devaluation of the ruble at a time when the central bank doesn’t have the reserves to influence the market, as it did in the past crises.”

The Russian economy is getting battered by the painful combination of Western sanctions and low oil prices. The country is expected to fall into a recession next year.

Global investors are increasingly concerned that tumult in Russia might not be isolated. Many emerging markets like Venezuela and Nigeria are dependent on their energy exports, which are being hurt by the deep and sustained decline in oil prices. Oil is now trading at around $55 a barrel, compared to more than $100 a barrel this summer.

Emerging markets are also under pressure as the Federal Reserve in the United States shifts strategy. Some countries like Turkey and South Africa have depended heavily on external financing to aid their growth. They have been hurt by expectations that the Fed would raise rates.

“There is country-specific risk for Russia that’s not going to go away,” said ​Phyllis Papadavid, a foreign exchange strategist at BNP Paribas in London. “But there’s a larger story.”

In Russia, investors are growing increasingly worried that the Kremlin has in effect decided to print money to address a growing debt problem. Traders are also raising concern that the cronyism and opaque insider dealings that have plagued business here have now spread to monetary policy.

According to analysts, the ruble’s fall on Monday was sparked by word of an opaque deal involving the central bank and the state-controlled oil company, Rosneft. The well-connected business executive running the company, Igor I. Sechin, a longtime associate of Mr. Putin, had apparently persuaded the central bank to effectively issue billions of new rubles to his company to help cover debts.

The governor of the central bank, Elvira Nabiullina, speaking on Russian television, said the interest rate decision had been made to stanch the fall of the ruble. In its moves, the Russian central bank also increased allotments of dollars to the Russian banking system to finance the purchase of rubles as part of the effort to stabilize the currency.

“We have to learn to live in a different zone, to orient ourselves more toward our own sources of financing,” she said. In her televised remarks, Ms. Nabiullina said Russia would not resort to capital controls to stem the ruble’s fall.

But traders have long fretted that Ms. Nabiullina, a former economy minister, lacked the political spine to stand up to Mr. Putin or his longtime allies like Mr. Sechin. And yet, though the absence of any credible independence by the central bank is at the heart of the ruble crisis today, it is unclear any figure in Russia could provide it given the ever more authoritarian nature of Mr. Putin’s rule.

Aleksei L. Kudrin, a former finance minister, wrote on Twitter that “the fall of the ruble and the stock market is not just a reaction to the low price of oil and to sanctions, but also due to a lack of confidence in the government’s economic policy.”

In the oil boom years, the government of Mr. Putin assumed an ever-larger role in the economy. Longtime associates of Mr. Putin’s from his hometown, St. Petersburg, or from his years in the Soviet KGB intelligence agency took the helms of huge new state-owned enterprises. All the while, the central bank and a liberal wing of economic policy advisers kept aloof from this politically driven divvying up of assets.

Now, market sentiment is shifting. A continued fall in the value of the ruble could present Mr. Putin with difficult choices and could make it more difficult to sustain the political support he has enjoyed at home even as his relations with the West have frayed.

He faces a particularly delicate dance with Russian companies, which are under significant financing strains. Russian corporations and banks are scheduled to repay $30 billion in foreign loans this month.

And next year, about $130 billion will be due. There is no obvious source for these hard currency payments other than the central bank, whose credibility is now being called into question.

Rosneft, for example, had been clamoring for months for a government bailout to refinance debt the company ran up while making acquisitions when oil prices were high. Because of sanctions, those loans cannot be rolled over with Western banks. Debt payments are coming due later this month.

Relying only on the company’s own cash reserves would disrupt oil development projects that Russia is relying on for future revenue. With the oil giant in a bind, the central bank ruled that it would accept Rosneft bonds held by commercial banks as collateral for loans.

Rosneft issued 625 billion rubles about $10.9 billion at the exchange rate at the time, in new bonds on Friday. The identities of the buyers were not publicly disclosed, but analysts say that large state banks bought the issue.

When these banks deposit the bonds with the central bank in exchange for loans, Rosneft will have been financed, in effect, with an emission of rubles from the central bank. The deal roiled the ruble on Monday, according to analysts.

The reason for Monday’s currency crash is “well known,” Boris Y. Nemtsov, a former deputy prime minister who is now in the political opposition, wrote on his Facebook page. “The central bank started the printing press to help the Sechin-Putin business, and gave Rosneft 625 billion newly printed rubles. The money immediately appeared on the currency market, and the rate collapsed.” Rosneft, in a statement, denied it had exchanged funds raised from the bonds for hard currency.

“This is a result of aggression and insanity in foreign policy, which led to sanctions,” Mr. Nemtsov wrote of the ruble’s collapse.

Source: the newyorktimes, 16 dec 2014

Sorry, Putin Russia’s economy is doomed by Matt O’Brien


A funny thing happened on the way to Vladimir Putin running strategic laps around the West. Russia’s economy imploded.

The latest news is that Russia’s central bank raised interest rates from 10.5 to 17 percent at an emergency 1 a.m. meeting in an attempt to stop the ruble, which is down 50 percent on the year against the dollar, from falling any further. It’s a desperate move to save Russia’s currency that comes at the cost of sacrificing Russia’s economy.

But even that wasn’t enough. After a brief rally, the ruble resumed its cliff-diving ways on Tuesday, falling another 14 percent to a low of 80 rubles per dollar. It was 60 rubles per dollar just the day before. The problem is simple. Oil is still falling, and ordinary Russians don’t want to hold their money in rubles even if they get paid 17 percent interest to do so. In other words, there’s a well-justified panic. So now Russia is left with the double whammy of a collapsing currency and exorbitant interest rates. Checkmate.

It’s a classic kind of emerging markets crisis. It’s only a small simplification, you see, to say that Russia doesn’t so much have an economy as it has an oil exporting business that subsidizes everything else. That’s why the combination of more supply from the United States, and less demand from Europe, China, and Japan has hit them particularly hard. Cheaper oil means Russian companies have fewer dollars to turn into rubles, which is just another way of saying that there’s less demand for rubles—so its price is falling. It hasn’t helped, of course, that sanctions over Russia’s incursion into Ukraine have already left Russia short on dollars.

Add it all up, and the ruble has fallen something like 22 percent against the dollar the past month, with 11 percent of that coming on Monday alone. As you can see below, the Russian ruble has fallen even further than the Ukrainian hryvnia or Brent oil has this year. The only asset, and I use that word lightly, that’s done worse than the ruble’s 50 percent fall is Bitcoin, which is a fake currency that techno-utopians insist is the future we don’t know we want.


And this is only going to get worse. Russia, you see, is stuck in an economic catch-22. Its economy needs lower interest rates to push up growth, but its companies need higher interest rates to push up the ruble and make all the dollars they borrowed not worth so much. So, to use a technical term, they’re screwed no matter what they do. If they had kept interest rates low, then the ruble would have continued to disintegrate, inflation would have spiked, and big corporations would have defaulted—but at least growth wouldn’t have fallen quite so much.

Instead, Russia has opted for the financial shock-and-awe of raising rates from 10.5 to 17 percent in one fell swoop. Rates that high will send Russia’s moribund economy into a deep recession—its central bank already estimates its economy will contract 4.5 to 4.7 percent if oil stays at $60-a-barrel—but they haven’t been enough to stop the ruble’s free fall. Russia might have to resort to capital controls to prop up the value of the ruble now, and might even have to ask the IMF for a bailout, too.

Putin’s Russia, like the USSR before it, is only as strong as the price of oil. In the 1970s, we made the mistake of thinking that the USSR’s invasion of Afghanistan meant we were losing the Cold War, when the reality was that they had stumbled into their own Vietnam and could only afford to feed their people as long as oil stayed sky-high. The USSR’s economic mirage, though, became apparent to everybody—none less than their own people, who had to scrounge in empty supermarkets—after oil prices bottomed out in the 1980s. That history is repeating itself now, just without the Marxism-Leninism. Putin could afford to invade Georgia and Ukraine when oil prices were comfortably in the triple digits, but not when they’re half that. Russia can’t afford anything then.

Putin might be playing chess while we play checkers, but only if we lend him the money for the set.


El barril de petróleo en EE UU se aleja de los 60 dólares, el País

Sandro Pozzi, nueva York, el País.

El precio del barril del petróleo en Estados Unidos arranca la última jornada de la semana bajo fuerte presión, tratando de no alejarse demasiado rápido de los 60 dólares el barril. Ese nivel ya lo perdió al cierre en la víspera, horas antes de que la Agencia Internacional de la Energía recortara de nuevo sus proyecciones para el mercado del crudo. Es la quinta revisión a la baja en cinco meses.

La AIE habla ahora de que la demanda global incrementará en 900.000 barriles diarios en 2015, cuando en la última proyección la colocaba en los 1,13 millones. Más allá de los números precisos que da el organismo, anticipa que este calo próximo al 50% en los últimos meses no va a tener un efecto en la cadena de suministro de petróleo ni tampoco en la demanda a corto plazo.

El incremento en la demanda que prevé la AIE para el año próximo es inferior al 1%. Su análisis pone en evidencia que ni la Organización de países Productores y Exportadores de Petroléo, ni EE UU ni Rusia vayan a hacer lo suficiente para retirar crudo del mercado y ajustarlo más al consumo. La agencia cree, además, que el estímulo al crecimiento económico será « modesto ».

Con este panorama, el petróleo que se negocia en Nueva York se cambiaba a media sesión en los 57,7 dólares, lo que representa una caída superior al 3,5% frente al cierre del jueves. El de referencia en Europa bajó a los 62,7 dólares. Tanto el West Texas como el Brent se están subastando a precios que se veían en el verano de 2009, cuando la crisis económica tocaba fondo en EE UU.

Bill Richardson, exsecretario de Energía de EE UU, ve posible que el barril de petróleo se acerque a los 45 dólares si la situación actual se mantiene. Es una muy mala noticia para los productores que emergieron con las nuevas técnicas de extracción. Harold Hamm, fundador de Continental Petroleum, perdió más de la mitad de su fortuna desde que empezó la brusca corrección.

Efectos colaterales

Además del efecto que el desplome pueda tener en la emergente industria del shale, el debate que tiene lugar en paralelo es cómo un precio tan barato del crudo puede afectar a medio plazo a la producción de energía a través de fuentes renovables. La tecnología solar y la eólica, para ser realmente competitivas, necesitan que el crudo esté por encima de los 100 dólares.

El informe de la AIE alerta, al mismo tiempo, del efecto desestabilizador que esta fuerte caída en el valor del crudo puede llegar tener en países que como Rusia y Venezuela dependen tanto de los ingresos que les genera el petróleo. También habla de las dificultades financieras en las que pueden verse las compañías productoras más endeudadas.

Más a corto plazo, está por ver cómo asume esta nueva realidad la Reserva Federal a la hora de modular su estrategia de vuelta a la normalidad monetaria. El fuerte abaratamiento del precio del petróleo se reflejó en la evolución de los precios en la cadena de producción, que cayeron un 0,2% en noviembre. El banco central de EE UU se reúne la semana que viene.

La caída fue mayor de la esperada y se reflejó también en otros componentes del indicador, no solo en el combustible. El riesgo deflacionista, en todo caso, no es tan alto como en Europa. Pero lo que también es cierto es que una caída de precios puede representan un lastre para el crecimiento económico si la baja inflación actual resulta no ser tan transitoria como dice la Fed.

l’ours polaire, un petit être vivant oublié par Nathalie Lacladère


En nombre restreint de 20 000, l’ours polaire vit sur le territoire du Canada, Etats-Unis, Groenland, Norvège et Russie.

L’ours polaire supporte les températures les plus basses.

Il possède une très bonne protection contre le froid, son épais pelage ne laisse pas passer l’eau et son épaisse couche de graisse sous la peau lui permet de résister à des froideurs extrêmes. Cette importante épaisseur de graisse lui permet de passer de longues périodes sans manger.

L’ours polaire est menacé par le réchauffement climatique. Il est à craindre que ce magnifique ours n’aura pas suffisamment de temps pour s’adapter au réchauffement brutal des régions polaires.

Il faut bien souligner que l’ours polaire a eu beaucoup plus de temps pour s’adapter aux rigueurs du froid arctique.

L’Ursus maritimus dont l’espérance de vie est 35 ans, pourra-t-il survivre au réchauffement climatique?

Auteur: Nathalie Lacladère.


Les billets…d’Etat

A l’origine l’Angleterre n’assure pas les échéances du Trésor public à l’aide de sa Banque.

D’autres pays utilisent leur monnaie.

L’idée consiste à frapper une importante quantité de monnaie, dont le coût de production reste inférieur à sa valeur faciale.

Exemples: Espagne et Russie vers 1660.

Cependant, les conséquences de cette action se font ressentir sur la population car les pièces en trop grande quantité ne sont plus appréciables étant en dessous de leur valeur d’émission.

Un autre moyen consiste à créer des billets d’Etat.

En effet, une banque sous contrôle ou bien le Trésor public émet des billets pour faire face aux échéances.

Le Massachusetts et la Pennsylvanie procède à de nouvelles émissions.

Benjamin Franklin publie en 1729 une étude sur la nature et la nécessité d’une monnaie de papier.

Les billets du Massachusetts et de Caroline du Sud émis en trop grande quantité perdent l’essentiel de leur valeur.

Le parlement de Londres craint une contagion et songe à interdire toute émission.

Benjamin Franklin s’en indigne:

« Je n’arrive pas à penser que l’Angleterre ait intérêt à nous empêcher de fabriquer la quantité de papier-monnaie qui nous paraît convenable; nous sommes les meilleurs juges de nos propres besoins ».

La guerre d’indépendance est financée par l’émission de billets.

En 1791 le congrès confie l’émission de nouveaux billets à la banque des USA, banque à capitaux privés calquée sur le modèle de la Banque d’Angleterre.

En Russie, Catherine II crée deux établissements(un à Moscou et un à Saint-Pétersbourg) nommés « banques d’assignation » responsable d’émettre des assignats (équivalents aux billets d’Etat).

Mais c’est en France que les assignats font fureur. John Law, un financier, propose de mettre fin à la dette publique et de couvrir les déficits budgétaire.

Il fonde une société privée qui corespond à une banque par actions. Il gagne la confiance de la population, ainsi les individus se mettent à acheter des actions au comptant en échange d’un prêt de billet par la banque.

Les français s’initient ainsi à la spéculation sans aucune connaissance en bourse.

L’entreprise de Law se retrouve créancière de l’Etat. Elle échange les créances en frappant la monnaie. Durant cette période les frappes de monnaies sont peu rentables, Law en profite pour déprécier les pièces métalliques.

En 1790, la révolution française commence, la caisse d’Escompte meurt et la Banque de France naît à l’identique de la Banque d’Angleterre.

Analyse de la planète Vénus

Pendant que les USA étudiaient Mars, la Russie en 1970 ont envoyé Vénéra 7 une sonde russe vers Vénus pour l’étudier.

Elle fut le premier engin à atterrir sur le sol vénusien.

Le 27/03/1972, sonde Venera 8, URSS. Elle mesure les variations de vitesse des vents vénusiens.

Le 8/06/1975, sonde Venera 9, URSS. Elle photographie les nuages de Vénus.

Le 14/06.1975, sonde Venera 10, URSS. Elle photographie les nuages de Vénus.

Le 20/05/1978, sonde Pioneer Vénus 1, USA. Premier engin à utiliser le radar pour prendre des images de la surface vénusienne.

Le 08/08/1978,Pioneer Vénus 2, USA. Analyse atmosphérique et la sonde se consume dans la haute atmosphère.

Par la suite, URSS: Venera 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16. Vega 1 et Vega 2 de 1977 à 1984.

Plus tard, La sonde Magellan, appelée aussi le radar Mapper Vénus, était un 1035-kg (£ 2,282) robotique sonde spatiale lancée par la NASA le 4 mai 1989, avait pour mission de cartographier la surface de Vénus en utilisant un radar à synthèse d’ouverture et de mesurer le planétaire champ gravitationnel.

La sonde Magellan était la première mission interplanétaire à être lancé à partir de la navette spatiale, le premier à utiliser l’ inertie étage supérieur booster pour le lancement, et le premier vaisseau spatial pour tester aérofreinage comme méthode de circularisation de son orbite. Magellan était le quatrième succès de la NASA mission vers Vénus, et il a fini un écart de onze ans dans des États-Unis lancements de sondes interplanétaires.

Le 9 novembre 2005, une sonde russe a été lancée, sa mission, franchir des millions de kms pour trouver l’énigme de Vénus.

Huit sondes interplanétaires russes seront lancées jusqu’en 2020.

La sonde Venera-D, sera lancée vers Vénus en 2016.

Sa mission consistera à prendre des photos de la surface de la planète, à faire l’étude de la composition chimique de son atmosphère et son activité sismique.

Egalement la température et la pression qui y règnent seront mesurées.

Le mystère de Vénus

La planète sœur de la Terre est une énigme.

1) Vénus et la Terre : Ressemblances et différences.
2) Qu’est ce que Vénus ?
3) Les grandes découvertes : 1930, 1950, 1960, 1970
4) Les recherches soviétiques
5) Vénus et « L’effet de serre »
6) La navette Atlantis et l’expédition Magellan
7) Les reliefs et cratère Vénusiens
8) Les prochaines vagues d’exploitations et outils
9) Qu’apprendre de Vénus

Vladimir Nabokov: L’enfance de l’art. Portrait de l’écrivain en « premier homme » seul dans les langues

résumé de l’article écrit par Isabelle Poulin, professeur de littérature comparée à l’Université Montaigne, Bordeaux dans:

Revue de littérature comparée

n° 342, 2012/2

Vladimir Nabokov ou le vrai et le vraisemblable

S’il s’agit de comprendre d’où écrit Vladimir Nabokov, il n’est pas sans intérêt d’interroger l’espace plurilingue de l’enfance d’où émerge, paradoxalement, la conscience d’un commencement absolu : le paradigme de la première fois (motif omniprésent dans cette œuvre bilingue) éclaire la pratique artistique de Nabokov entre les langues, aussi bien du point de vue de l’engendrement de l’œuvre que de sa filiation.

L’original de Nabokov est ainsi à chercher dans une pratique de la lecture qui s’apparente à une expérience de l’inadéquation, mêlant solitude (nécessaire au travail de la traduction) et humour (signature propre de l’auteur).